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Fabricant: Homicide and Rape

HOMICIDE IN RESPONSE TO
A THREAT OF RAPE:
A THEORETICAL
EXAMINATION OF
THE RULE OF
JUSTIFICATION
Judith Fabricant*
The intentional killing of a human being is the most serious
of crimes.1 Nevertheless, the law declines to punish homicides
when they are committed under certain circumstances. The
most broadly recognized defense against criminal liability for
homicide is that of self-defense. The law permits homicide not
only in defense of life, but also, under certain circumstances, in
defense of such interests as property, liberty, and physical integrity.2 That one who kills an aggressor in defense of his or her
own life should escape punishment is hardly susceptible of serious debate. The privilege of self-defense under these circumstances is universally recognized, and legal scholars have developed coherent explanations for it. s When the aggressor threatens
interests other than life itself, however, the rationale for the
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1980. Ms. Fabricant is an associate with a Boston law firm.
The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professors Jay Katz and Steven Duke of
the Yale Law School for their invaluable criticism and guidance.
1. One commentator describes life as the highest value because it is the prerequisite
to the enjoyment of all other values. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in
the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 871, 871 (1976). According to Blackstone, the taking
of life is the most important crime because life "is the immediate gift of God to man."
W. BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF ENGLAND 1432 (W. Lewis ed. 1897).
2. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 143(2) (1965); E. COKE, THE TmRD PART
OF THE INsTITUTEs OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 55 (London 1809); M. FOSTER, CROWN LAw
273-74 (London 1767); M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 28-31 (London 1678); W. LA FAYE
& A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 403 (1972); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL
GOVERNMENT § 7, at 289-90 (P. Lasset ed. 1967); J. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 981 (1969).
3. See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 860 (1978); M. FosTER, supra
note 2, at 273-74; J. LOCKE, supra note 2, § 7, at 289; Fletcher, Proportionality and the
Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 IsRAEL L. REv. 367
(1967); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale for the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REv.
701 (1937).
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law's acceptance of a homicidal response is less obvious. But the
development of such a rationale is crucial to any critical evaluation of legal rules distinguishing between aggression which justifies or excuses the use of deadly force and that which does not.
One form of nondeadly aggression which can provoke a
homicidal defensive reaction is the threat of rape. Anglo-American law has consistently recognized the right of a woman to defend herself against rape, even by killing her assailant! Although this rule of justification may be nullified in application
by prosecutors and juries,G the legal privilege has persisted even
as the law of self-defense has narrowed in other respects. 6
Although courts and commentators have recognized the rule
almost without exception, they have failed to formulate any co4. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 17 (West Supp. 1981), 197 (West 1970), 264 (West
Supp. 1981). In California, homicide is justifiable when committed by a person resisting
an attempt to commit a felony. ld. § 197. Felony is defined as any crime punishable by
death or by imprisonment in the state prison. ld. § 17. Rape is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. ld. § 264; see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (Smith-Hurd
1972) (use of deadly force justified to prevent a forcible felony), § 2-8 (rape is a forcible
felony); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(I)(b)(iii) (West 1980) (deadly force justified if
necessary to prevent against death or serious bodily harm); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
35.15(2)(b) (McKinney 1975) (deadly force against another person justifiable in the reasonable belief that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible sodomy or robbery); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2}
(Purdon 1973) (deadly force justifiable if actor reasonably believes it necessary to protect
against sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §
9.32(3)(b} (Vernon 1974) (deadly force against another justified to prevent the imminent
commission of rape or aggravated rape).
See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(l} (Tent. Draft No.8, 1958); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 65(b) (1965); W. BLACKSTONE, supra note I, at 1605-12; M. HALE,
supra note 2, at 28-31; M. FOSTER, supra note 2, at 274; J. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 99.
5. After the conviction of Inez Garcia in her first trial for killing her rapist, a juror
told interviewers that, "You can't kill someone for trying to give you a good time."
Schneider & Jordon, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to
Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S RIGHTS REP., 149, 154 (1978). In Woods v. State,
240 Ga. 265, 239 S.E.2d 786 (1977), two women claimed self-defense against rape as a
defense to a murder charge. The trial judge refused to dismiss for cause a juror who had
expressed disapproval of killing to avoid rape. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction. See also S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST Oua WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 356
(1975), quoting a woman who disabled a potential rapist with a kick to the groin, and
was subsequently advised by police that, had he died, she would have faced a charge of
manslaughter.
6. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 2, at 399. MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.06(3)(d)(ii) (Tent. Draft. No.8, 1958), provides a narrower rule on the law of selfdefense against property crimes than that of the common law as stated in M. HALE,
supra note 2, at 28-31, and E. COKE, supra note 2, at 55.
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herent theoretical explanation for it in the context of self-defense doctrine and of the criminal law generally. This paper will
attempt to identify the historical rationale for the privilege of
self-defense and the application of that rationale to justify homicide in defense against rape. It will then evaluate the continuation of the privilege of self-defense against rape by application
of the historical rationale to the experience of rape in the context of modern America.
This paper will attempt to show the criminal law has permitted homicide when committed in order to prevent crimes
which threaten harm so severe and permanent as to be incapable
of repair through subsequent legal proceedings. Rape has consistently been regarded as such a crime. The paper will identify
the interests which rape has been seen to threaten as those interests which derive their significance from a social system in
which women are the property of men. It will argue that, to the
extent changing social values have reduced the significance of
those interests, they are no longer adequate to support the privilege of homicidal self-defense against rape. To evaluate the current legitimacy of the rule, it is necessary to identify the harm of
rape in the modern social context and to decide whether that
harm is irreparable. This paper will attempt to identify at least
some of the interests threatened by rape and to show how the
deprivation of those interests might be irreparable, so as to justify a continuing privilege of homicidal self-defense.
For purposes of this paper, rape is defined as sexual intercourse involving some degree of genital penetration, accomplished by force or threat of force. Most of what follows would
apply as well to anal penetration of one man by another, or even
to penetration with an object by or upon a person of either sex.
The paradigm of genital penetration of a female by a male is
used because it is the most common form of sexual assault and
because it is the type envisioned in the formulation of the common law rules. Consensual acts in which consent is legally invalid because of minority or incompetence, and those in which
consent is obtained by fraud, are not considered because such
cases are unlikely to give rise to homicidal acts of self-defense,
and because the interests affected by such acts differ from those
affected by forcible rape.
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I. THE RATIONALE-FOR THE PRIVILEGE OF HOMICI-

DAL SELF-DEFENSE
Defenses to criminal liability are assertions of facts that
identify the act as one which, although within a general category
defined as criminal, the state declines to punish. The early common law recognized the defense of crime prevention as a justification; the act was proper, and therefore not prohibited.7 The
doctrine of crime prevention justified a homicide committed by
an innocent actor if necessary to prevent an "atrocious crime."s
The defense applied whether the crime prevented had been directed at the actor or at a third party. If the act met the definition of crime prevention, it was fully lawful and justified, and
the actor was worthy of "commendation rather than blame."9
In stating that an act of crime prevention deserves commen-

dation, even when it entails a homicide, Blackstone suggests the
intuitively acceptable idea that one who kills to prevent the
commission of a serious crime furthers the common purpose of
protecting the essential characteristics of human life. Unfortunately, Blackstone fails to indicate precisely how homicide
serves that purpose. Because the ~ediate effect of the act is
to destroy life and to frustrate the state's effort to protect the
life of the homicide victim, the act seems contrary to that purpose. An effort to understand and evaluate the scope of the defense of crime prevention must begin by identifying more clearly
the general rationale underlying the defense.
A.

CHOICE OF EVILS THEORY

At least three rationales for recognizing the defense may be
considered. The first may be called the "choice of evils" theory.
According to this theory, the aggressor, who becomes the victim
of the homicide, has created a situation in which at least one life
must be lost. Having thwarted the state's effort to protect all
life, he or she has forced the state to ch90se among the values it
seeks to protect. Faced with the alternatives of one death or another, the state chooses to protect the life of the innocent actor
7. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 798, for a discussion of the difference between
justification and excuse.
8. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1432.
9.Id.
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at the cost of that of the aggressor.
The weighing of values involved in the choice of lives is not
immediately apparent. If the state allows an innocent actor to
kill the aggressor, the result is one death. Similarly, if the state
prohibits such a killing, the result could also be one death. The
difference between the two possible choices, in this situation, is
the identity of the life protected. Unless those lives differ in
value, the state's choice between them is arbitrary.
If all people are considered equal, and all life is valued

equally, the choice among lives cannot rest on any judgment of
the social value of particular individuals or categories of persons,
as a matter of social utility. But one factor which might be
weighed is the culpability of the parties. According to this view,
the aggressor's guilt reduces the value of his or her life, so that,
in sacrificing that life to the life of the innocent potential victim,
the state preserves the greater value. If the threatened aggression is directed at a lesser crime than murder, the value of the
aggressor's life is reduced proportionately. Depending on the seriousness of the crime threatened, the aggressor's guilt may
bring the value of his or her life to a level below that of whatever
interest he or she has threatened. 10
At :first glance this analysis seems consistent with the idea
of punishment by desert; the aggressor deserves to die, and,
therefore, his or her death is just. But to say that one deserves
to die does not mean one's life has less value than other lives or
the interests of others.ll Rather, the principle of"punishment by
desert is premised on the idea of equality; the natural equality
between offender and victim is restored by imposing upon the
offender a deprivation equal to that which he or she has inflicted. 12 The aggressor's guilt does not reduce the value of his or
her life.
The theory of discounting the life of the aggressor according
to guilt also fails to account for the case in which the aggressor's
10. G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 858.
11. Kadish, supra note 1, at 880. See also I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 196 (W.
Hastie trans. 1887).
12. 1. KANT, supra note 11, at 196.
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act is excused, and therefore reflects no guilt. IS For e~ample, if
the aggressor is a child or an insane person, and therefore not
responsible for his or her actions, the attempted homicide indicates no moral culpability which could serve as a rationale for
discounting the value of his or her life. Even under those circumstances, however, the law permits an innocent person to prevent the homicide by killing the excused aggressor.
If valuation of the aggressor's life cannot be reduced accord-

ing to guilt, then the "choice of evils" rationale fails entirely to
explain the privilege of homicidal prevention of non-deadly
crimes even if it is accepted to explain the privilege to prevent
murder. If the privilege of self-defense is viewed as a choice by
the state between the aggression threatened and the aggressor's
death, it follows that homicide is justified only by threats to interests which outweigh the value of the aggressor's life. Life itself, however, is generally regarded as the highest of values. l•
The value of life suggests that the only threat which would justify homicide is a threat to life itself.lli But such a strict limitation on the privilege of self-defense has never prevailed in the
law.
Some courts and commentators have attempted to rationalize the justification of homicide as a defense to lesser threats by
suggesting that each of the lesser threats included carries an implicit threat to life itself.16 Thus, a "dangerous felony," which
may be prevented by homicide, is one that carries a "substantial
risk of death or serious bodily harm";I'1 "serious bodily harm" is
defined as "harm which creates a substantial risk of fatal consequences."l8 The privilege of self-defense thus extends to prevention of threats of serious bodily harm because such threats carry
a direct or indirect risk of death. The argument is further extended to justify homicide in defense of the actor's habitation,
because the possession of a safe home is necessary to the protec13. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 376; Kadish, supra note 1, at 880.
14. See note 1 supra.
15. See Note, Justification for the Use of Force in the Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L.
REv. 566 (1961).
16. See J. PERKINS, supra, note 2, at 991; State v. Harris, 222 N.W.2d 462 (Iowa
S. Ct. 1974).
17. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTt', supra note 2, at 406.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63(1) (1965).
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tion of his or her life from any and all threats. IS
This theory has also been extended to account for the inclusion of rape in the list of crimes which may be prevented by
homicide; courts have relied on a presumption of danger to life
in the act of rape. 20 But this presumption involves a failure to
distinguish between the crime of rape and the other crimes
which may accompany it. A rapist may kill his victim or may
inflict bodily injury so severe as to create a risk of fatal consequences; in that case he commits a second crime in addition to
rape. That second crime threatens life, and would therefore justify prevention by homicide even without the rape, but the rape
itself does not necessarily threaten life. 21 Unaccompanied byanother crime, rape may fit within the category of nonserious bodily harm, defined by the Restatement of Torts as "any physical
impairment of the condition of another's body, or physical pain
or illness."22 Although some rapes may be accomplished without
physical impairment, pain, or illness, the act does necessarily entail such risks.
When applied to crimes which do carry an inherent risk of
death, this reasoning fails to account for the equation between
certain death and risk of death. The actor is permitted to kill
the aggressor to avoid a danger which poses some possibility of
his or her own or another's death. The probability ranges from
the more remote risk involved in an intrusion into one's home to
the greater risk in the infliction of a gunshot or knife wound. In
19. See People v. Eatman, 405 m. 2d 491, 91 N.E.2d 387 (1950).
20. State v. Harris, 222 N.W.2d 462 (Iowa S. Ct. 1974). See also J. PERKINS, supra
note 2, at 991.
21. Rape does necessarily carry a risk of pregnancy for those women who are fertile,
and pregnancy does carry some risk of death. For some women, because of their physical
or social characteristics, the risk of death in childbirth as a result of rape may be so great
that a threat of rape would, by itself, carry a substantial risk of death. For these women,
this reasoning may be adequate to support the privilege. For other potential victims, it is
at least arguable that, because rape is so often accompanied by other violent crimes, a
threat of rape is always sufficient to engender in the woman threatened a reasonable fear
of being killed. If this proposition were accepted, there would be no need for a privilege
of self-defense against rape; any woman who killed a man attempting to rape her would
be able to assert the privilege of self-defense against murder, citing the threatened rape
as evidence of her reasonable fear of death at the hands of her assailant. In that case" the
question raised by this paper would be a purely hypothetical one: If a woman threatened
with rape did not experience a fear of death, would she nevertheless be justified in killing
her assailant to prevent the rape? And if so, why?
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (1965).
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each case, however, the probability is less than the complete certainty of death which actually occurs. As long as each life is valued equally, nothing less than 100 percent certainty can outweigh the value of the aggressor's life. 23
A somewhat more satisfying variant of the "choice of evils"
rationale is the theory that, by choosing the life of the innocent
person over that of the aggressor, the law protects life in general,
because the aggressor poses a general threat to life, which the
innocent person does not. Although the two lives in question on
this occasion have equal value, the loss of one is less an evil than
the loss of the other; one poses a greater threat of future evil.
Thus, the state serves its overriding goal of protecting life by
preferring the life that poses less danger to others. This explanation acknowledges the underlying purpose of state authority and
of the criminal law, without violating the principle of equality.
But it rests on an empirical assumption which is open to question: that one who attempts to kill on one occasion is more likely
than .others to do so again.
The "choice of evils" theory, in all its variations, focuses on
the relationship between the state and the homicide victim (the
original aggressor), and seeks to explain the state's willingness to
permit the death of the aggressor under the circumstances. The
theory attempts to formulate criteria to measure the social loss
resulting from a particular death, and to balance the loss against
the evil threatened by the aggressor. The "choice of evils" theory does not address the rights or interests. of the actor who
commits the homicide (the victim of the original aggression); it
merely evaluates the social costs and benefits of the act.
B. An Hoc

DEATH PENALTY THEORY

A second rationale for the justification of crime prevention
is that the rule serves to deter crime by operating as sort of an
ad hoc death penalty; the potential felon is put on notice that he
or she is subject to homicide at the hands of any person, private
or official, who acts to prevent the crime. By deterring crime in
this way, the state serves its general purpose of protecting the
23. See G.

FLETCHER,

supra note 3, at 858.
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essential values of human life.24
This explanation assumes first that potential felons know of .
the rule and plan their crimes accordingly. Second, it assumes
that the threat of death deters crime, an assumption that has
been widely discredited in the on-going controversy over the
death penalty.21S Third, the theory assumes that the threat of an
ad hoc death penalty imposed before or during the act adds to
the deterrence value of the death penalty to be imposed after
the crime. In a system of imperfect law enforcement and uncertain punishment, this assumption may have some basis in fact.
But it seems highly unlikely, at least to this writer, that the
privilege of self-defense would be eliminated even if law enforcement were perfect and every felon were punished.26
Even if these empirical assumptions proved correct, however, the ad hoc death penalty rationale entails two theoretical
problems. First, if that rationale explains the justification of
crime prevention, it fails to explain the limitation of that justification: the act must be necessary to prevent the crime. If the
actor's privilege is intended to deter crime, it should logically
extend to one who kills when the crime could be prevented by
less drastic means, or even to one who witnesses a crime and
kills the fleeing felon.
Second, the ad hoc death penalty theory fails to account for
cases in which the aggressor's act, although unlawful, is excused.
Here again, it is useful to consider the example of a child or an
insane person who is about to kill an innocent person. To put
such a person on notice that his or her act of aggression may
result in his or her own death can hardly serve as a deterrent to
that aggression. Even when applied to excused aggressors, the
rule may serve to deter other potential felons who would not be
24. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 3, at 735-36; Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio 186, 200
(1876). Blackstone lends support to this theory with the observation that any crime "in
itself capital" may be prevented by the death of the aggressor. W. BLACKSTONE, supra
note 1, at 1432. See also L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAw 92-93 (1968), observing that
state laws which excuse or justify a husband's killing his wife's lover establish a rule of
ad hoc capital punishment for men who commit adultery with married women.
25. See, e.g., C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE 25-27 (1974).
26. See also Kadish, supra note 1, at 880.
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excused. 27 But, if so applied, the rule would use the aggressor for
the benefit of the rest of the community; it would deprive him or
her of state protection to increase the protection afforded to the
potential victims of other aggressors. Such use of the excused
aggressor would subordinate his or her life and interests to the
interests of others, denying him or her treatment as the equal of
all others.28
The ad hoc death penalty theory, like the "choice of evils"
theory, focuses on the utility of the act of homicide for the
state's overall purpose of protecting life generally. It attempts to
rationalize the state's failure to protect the life of the aggressor
(victim of the homicide) by balancing the loss of that life against
the general social benefit resulting from the homicide. The theory does not address any rights or interests of the actor (victim
of the original aggression) who commits the homicide.
C.

SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY

A third theory invokes the concept of a social contract as to
the source of state authority. Under this view, the state in a civilized society has the exclusive right to use force, because the individual members of the society have all relinquished to it their
natural right of self-protection by force. The members of the society have joined in the social contract for the sake of the
greater protection afforded by a common authority. Because the
state exists for the protection of its members, the social contract
includes a built-in limitation: each individual retains -his or her
natural rights for exercise in situations where appeal to established authority is impossible. Such a situation arises when aggression is sudden and immediate, so that state intervention
cannot prevent its effect, and when the effect of the aggression
threatened would be so severe and lasting that no subsequent
state response could adequately substitute for prevention. In
such cases, the parties are no longer fellow citizens whose interaction is regulated by a common authority; they are, in Locke's
phrase, combatants in a "state of war." By depriving his or her
victim of the possibility of appeal to law, the aggressor bypasses
the interaction with civil society and loses any claims to its pro27. G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 815.
28. [d.

Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol11/iss3/7

10

Fabricant: Homicide and Rape

1981]

HOMICIDE AND RAPE

955

tection. The victim of aggression is restored to his or her rights
under natural law, including the right to protect him or herself
just as each individual would if no state authority existed.29
This rationale shifts the focus of analysis from the state':.;
abandonment of its responsibility to protect the homicide victim
(the original aggressor) to the natural right of the actor (the
original victim) to protect those interests for the protection of
which the state was established in a situation in which state protection is unavailable. Because the actor has that right naturally,
and has not relinquished it to the authority of the state, the
state has no power to prohibit its exercise. Recognition of the
justification, then, is not a choice by the state to serve its purposes, but an acknowledgement of the limitations on its authority. Those limitations derive from the purposes for which free
individuals established the state and consented to its imposition
of a criminal law.
This rationale applies to the case of the excused aggressor
as well as that of the culpable aggressor. The essential factor
which triggers the natural right of self-defense is not the guilt of
the aggressor, but the victim-actor's lack of opportunity for appeal to the law. The excused aggressor, the child or insane person, may be unwitting, and therefore not responsible. But the
aggressor's lack of responsibility is irrelevant, because the victim's act of homicide in self-defense does not constitute punishment of the aggressor or valuation of his or her life. Nor does the
rule suggest a greater valuation of the life of the victim-actor.
Rather, the rule simply recognizes the natural right of the actor,
in the absence of legal authority, to protect his or her own interests. The lack of legal authority to which to appeal is the result
of the aggressor's use of force, and it is thus the aggressor who
triggers the actor's right. But the right itself derives from nature, not from any act or any culpability of the aggressor. 30
The social contract theory is thus consistent with the common law rule of self-defense, and provides a rationale through
which the rule may be understood. The common law rule per29. J. LOCKE, supra note 2, § 19, at 298; Kadish, supra note I, at 247. See also
Ashworth, Self-Defense and the Right to Life, 34 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 282, 282-83 (1975);
Fletcher, supra note 3, at 378.
30. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 376.
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mitted homicide when necessary to prevent an act of unlawful
aggression, without regard to the identity of the aggressor. This
rule follows logically from the idea that the state's monopoly on
the use of force extends only to those situations in which state
protection is available, because the state's authority derives
from the voluntary association of individuals for the purpose of
their common security.
To summarize, the common law rule of crime prevention
may be best understood through a rationale based on the theory
of social contract: In situations of necessity, when state authority is unavailable to protect a citizen, the citizen is released from
the obligation to refrain from the use of force and is restored to
the natural right of self-protection.

II. THE SCOPE OF THE DEFENSE: RAPE AS IRREPARABLE HARM UNDER THE COMMON LAW
The social contract theory provides a rationale for the privilege of homicide in situations in which state protection is unavailable: the state's monoply on the use of force, because it derives from the voluntary grant of its members' powers of selfprotection, extends only as far as the state's power to protect its
members. When an act of aggression prevents resort to the common authority, the individual is restored to his or her natural
right of self-defense. .
The privilege of self-defense therefore extends to all acts of
aggression which preclude resort to state authority. Any event is,
of course, subject to official response after the fact. In that sense,
no form of aggression completely precludes state protection. But
some types of aggression result in injury which is so irreparable
as to preclude any effective state response after the fact. Because no subsequent action can fully repair the harm caused by
such acts, only prevention can adequately protect the citizen
whose interests are threatened. These forms of aggression, then,
remove the interaction from the jurisdiction of the common authority and restore to the individual the right of prevention by
force. 31
31. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 497 (1896) (homicide justified in response
to threat of "permanent injury"); M. FOSTER, supra note 2, at 274 (homicide to prevent
rape justified because "the injury intended can never be repaired or forgotten"); J.
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The privilege of self-defense therefore applies to prevention
of crimes which have permanent, irreparable consequences.
Death, of course, is clearly the most permanent consequence of
an act of aggression; no subsequent governmental action can restore the victim's life. The threat of homicide eliminates all possibility of appeal to authority for prevention of its consequences,
and thus restores to the victim his or her natural right to use
force to prevent the act. Similarly, other threats of permanent
deprivation, such as dismemberment or maiming, render state
protection unavailable and place the authority for crime prevention in the hands of the individual.
Every experience is permanent in the sense that its occurrence cannot be undone. Even simple assault, once committed,
cannot be undone by subsequent governmental action against
the offender. But simple assault does not trigger a right of homicidal self-defense. 32 Permanence of the event, therefore, as distinguished from permanence of the consequences of the event,
does not adequately describe the type of harm that may legitimately be prevented by homicide.
The difference between death and dismemberment, on the
one hand, and simple assault on the other, is in the significance
of the interest affected, as well as in the permanence of the loss
of that interest as a consequence of the act. The interest in life
is indisputably paramount; a deprivation of life, therefore, cannot be adequately compensated by subsequent events. The interest in physical wholeness also holds a universally recognized
importance; few people would trade a body part for any form of
compensation. Moreover, these interests, once lost, are gone forever. The interests affected by a simple assault are less important, and they are not forever lost because of a single event.
Reparation after the fact, therefore, may be sufficient to compensate for the deprivation suffered.
The type of harm which may be prevented by homicide may
LOCKE, supra note 2, § 19, at 292 (victim of threatened murder may kill assailant because threatened loss of life "irreparable").
32. See People v. Jones, 191 Cal. App. 2d 478, 482,12 Cal. Rptr. 777, 780 (1961), in
which the court observes: "A misdemeanor assault must be suffered without the privilege
of retaliating with deadly force." See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'lT, supra note 2, at 393,
observing that the use of deadly force against a nondeadly attack is never reasonable.
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be described as not only permanent, but irreparabl~: A deprivation of interests which, like the interest in life itself, are so vital
to their holder that the permanent deprivation cannot be repaired by any form of compensation after the fact. This category
of harm includes death and dismemberment, but it may also include whatever other experiences would permanently deprive an
individual of interests which, in the particular cultural setting,
are considered crucial to a life worth living. 33
Anglo-American law has consistently included rape among
the crimes that may be prevented by homicide. This rule reflects
a social judgment that the harm of rape is irreparable: a deprivation of the interests affected by rape cannot be repaired by any
subsequent compensation. To evaluate the continuing legitimacy
of the privilege of self-defense against rape, it is necessary to
identify that harm and those interests.
A review of the law of rape and the history of that law indicates that the crime of rape has been viewed as a threat to interests both of the female victim herself and of her husband, father, or other male relative. For the male, rape has been felt as a
threat to his interests in exclusive possession of a particular woman as a sexual object, either for his own use, in the case of a
husband, or for transfer to another, in the case of a father or
other relative. Threatened also has been the male's interest in
the social status, prestige, and "honor" which he gained through
exclusive possession of the woman involved. The history of rape
laws indicates that these interests have been considered of highest importance, worthy of the greatest protection available in
law.
The interests of the female victim that have received recognition in the law of rape are primarily interests which derive
33. Wechsler & Michael, supra note 3, at 740, describe the ends, other than preservation of life, that justify homicide as follows:
Such an end ... must be one the achievement of which by
common agreement is almost indispensable if life is to be
worth living ..•• Precisely as homicide is sometimes a necessary means to the preservation of life, it is sometimes a necessary means to the prevention of physical and psychic injuries
that usually prove to be permanent and seriously impair the
human capacities of those who suffer them.
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from her role as a possession of the male. By destroying the exclusiveness of the male's possession of her, rape has destroyed
her value to him. The law of rape expresses a recognition of the
female's interest in her value to men, along with the social status
and material well-being she might derive from it, as an interest
of great significance.
The identity of the interests protected by the law of rape
appears in the language of commentators, in the methods of law
enforcement, and in the application of the law to cases involving
women of differing status in relation to the property interests of
men.
Common law authorities as well as American cases refer frequently to rape as a violation of the victim's "chastity."s, The
word "chastity," as used by these sources, means more than voluntary abstinence from sexual activity. Abstinence is not even
suggested when the word is used in reference to a married woman. Rather, the word "chastity," as used by common law
judges and commentators, connotes conformity with a sexual
code imposed by law, social convention, and religious doctrine.
In describing rape as a violation of chastity, these sources indicate that the most significant harm of rape, the harm which is so
significant as to justify prevention by homicide, is the sexual act
unapproved by law or social convention.
The interests protected by the code of chastity are implicit
in the terms of the code itself; according to law and sexual convention in the Anglo-American world, chastity means premarital
abstinence and marital fidelity. A chaste woman, therefore, is
one who grants sexual access to one man alone, permanently and
irrevocably, becoming his exclusive possession. For a man, a
threat to chastity is a threat to the exclusiveness of his possession of the women of his household. For a woman, the deprivation of her own chastity is the deprivation of her capacity to
grant exclusive access to one man. The interests of both sexes in
the chastity of women have held a place of such importance that
their deprivation has been viewed as so irreparable as to warrant
prevention by homicide.
34. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 30 N.M. 178, 187, 230 P. 379 (1924); W.
supra note 1, at 1610; M. FOSTER, supra note 2, at 274.

BLACK-
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The interests protected by the law of rape appear also in
the exceptions to the prohibition of rape. The most notable exception, often stated in the definition of rape, is that between
spouses. The element of force or threat of force may be present,
but if the aggressor is the victim's husband, no act of sexual intercourse is prohibited by the law of rape. 35
If the law of rape were intended to protect the victim's au-

tonomy or freedom of choice, this exception would be anomalous; the use of force effects the same deprivation of choice no
matter who applies it. Hale explains the rule by the notion of
perpetual consent through marriage, but this explanation is a
legal fiction at best.38 Perkins offers a more persuasive explanation for the marriage exception. According to his definition, rape
is "unlawful carnal knowledge"-that is, sexual intercourse "not
authorized by law," and accomplished by force. 37 Because the
law authorizes sex within marriage, no act of sexual intercourse
between spouses can be unlawful, despite the use of force and
the absence of consent. Perkins' explanation reveals his understanding that the harm of rape is primarily the unlawful sex act,
the act in violation of chastity, not the use of force to deprive
the victim of her freedom of choice. A more candid restatement
of Perkins' explanation of the marriage exception would be that,
because a wife is the exclusive property of her husband, his use
of her cannot violate his own property interest in her. According
to Hawkins, ancient law extended the marital exception to concubinage as well.38 And a similar exception existed for the rape
35. See generally 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628 (R.
Stokes & M. Ingersoll eels. 1847); J. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 156; G. STEPHEN, A DIGEST
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 156 (7th ed. 1926); MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4(1) (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955) ("not his wife" included in definition). A Connecticut statute, enacted in 1975,
includes what its authors must have considered a "modem" change in the common law
rule: "[I]t shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant and the alleged victim were,
at the time of the alleged offense, living together by mutual consent in a relationship of
cohabitation, regardless of the legal status of their relationship." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a67(b) (West Supp. 1981). A few states have changed their rape laws in recent years to
eliminate the exception for spouses. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.305 (1977), and
163.375 (1971).
36. "[F]or by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract." M. HALE, supra note
35, at 628.
37. J. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 156.
38. "It was anciently said to be no rape to force a man's own concubine." I W. HAwKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 122 (J. Curwood ed. 1824). Compare Hawkins with the Con-
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of a slave by the master. Since she was the master's own property, his use of her could hardly violate the property interests of
any other man. 39
If the· law of rape exists to protect the property interests of
men, and the interests of women which derive from their status
as the property of men, it would follow that the law's protection
excludes the rape of a prostitute, who is the property of no man,
or perhaps of all men alike. And indeed the common law authors

expresssubstantialdotibtsas· t6wnether a prostitufecanbe· a
victim of rape. Blackstone reports that "the civil law seems to
suppose a prostitute or common harlot incapable of any iDjuries
of this kind; not allowing any punishment for violating the chastity of her who hath indeed no chastity at all, or at least hath no
regard to it."40 However, Blackstone distinguishes English law,
which, he explains, punishes the rape of a prostitute because of
the possibility that she might reform and regain her chastity.41
Blackstone's explanation assumes that the purpose of the
law of rape is to protect chastity. The prostitute is protected by
the law of rape because of the possibility that she might someday conform to the code of chastity and deliver herself to the
exclusive possession of some hypothetical man, whose interests
would then be violated by any other man's use of her, and whose
valuation of her would be diminished accordingly.
Perkins differs with Blackstone on application of the law of
rape to prostitutes. He observes that a rape differs from the
prostitute's usual activity only in the absence of payment, so
that it can hardly be considered an outrage to her. In his view,
the rape of a prostitute should be treated as a lesser crime, such
as assault and battery.42
Although they reach different conclusions, Perkins and
Blackstone base their views on the same implicit assumptions:
that the primary harm of rape is the act of sexual intercourse
outside of a legally sanctioned relationship. Because the prostinecticut statute at note 35 supra.
39. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 162-63.
40. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1610.
41. Id.
42. J. PERKINS, supra note 2, at 158.
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tute engages in such illicit sex regularly, the rape deserves no
special punishment in Perkins' view. Blackstone's thinking is
more generous, granting the possibility of reform and consequent restoration to a status worthy of legal protection.
Modern rape laws include no explicit exception for prostitutes, and no formal requirement of previous chastity on the
part of the victim. Nevertheless, rape trials often include inquiries into the previous sexual activity of the victim. In theory,
such evidence is admitted to support an inference of consent on
the occasion in question based on the fact of consent to similarly
illicit acts in the past. Whether or not such an inference is fairly
drawn, the experience of modern rape victims during trials, and
the infrequency of convictions, suggests that juries and defense
lawyers may use evidence of the Victim's past sexual behavior to
support application of an exception for unchaste victims even
though none exists in the law!8 A woman whose sexual choices
preclude her the status as one man's exclusive property may still
be considered unworthy of the law's protection, because no
man's property interests are affected by her violation, and because she has chosen to relinquish her ability to grant exclusive
possession to one man.
The interests protected by the law of rape appear in the de. sign of enforcement mechanisms as well as in exceptions to the
law. Perhaps the most illuminating example is the ancient Hebrew law, cited by Blackstone, that one who raped an unbetrothed virgin must pay a fine to the victim's father and marry
her with no power of divorce.44 This penalty suggests a scheme
of reparation for injury to the father's interest in arranging a
profitable marriage for his daughter. The requirement of marriage without right of divorce served both to relieve the father of
the burden of maintaining his daughter and to compensate the
victim herself for the loss of her interest in marriage. All other
43. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 370-74. See also Tolbert v. State, 31 Ala.
App. 301, 15 So.2d 745 (1943) (evidence as to murder defendant's previous sexual relationship with deceased admissible to impeach her credibility on rape claim, thereby disproving her claim of self-defense against rape); State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb. 359, 183
N.W.2d 258 (1971) (evidence as to murder defendant's activities as a prostitute admissible to discredit her claim of self-defense against rape).
44. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1607, citing Deuteronomy 22:25. The rapist was
punished by death if the victim was betrothed. [d.
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possibility of marriage had been destroyed with her virginity,
because she could no longer be offered to a potential husband as
his exclusive possession.
Hawkins reports a slightly modified version of this rule in
early English law. Under the English version, one who raped a
virgin would be punished with death, "unless such virgin would
accept of the offender for her husband. ".,,~ This rule placed a
particularly high priority on the recognized interests of the victim; by marrying the rapist, she could salvage at least one of the
benefits that depended on her virginity. The alternative of the
death penalty for the offender might suggest that the damage to
the victim's value to her potential husband could at least be
minimized if the other claimant to possession of her were dead.
In Hale's time, rape was punished by death. But its prosecution occurred only upon instigation by someone in the role of
a victim. If the woman herself failed to appeal, the right of appeal passed to her husband, or, if the victim was unmarried, to
her father or his heir. This rule follows quite logically from a
rape law designed to protect the property interests of men as
well as the interests of women in preserving their chaste status;
the husband or father, whose property interest had been violated, could vindicate that interest in court, regardless of the
wishes of the victim herself.46
The interests protected by rape laws in the common law tradition receive additional illumination from consideration of a related crime, that of stealing an heiress. This felony occurred
when a propertied virgin was abducted from the custody of her
parents or guardian and married, "defiled," or both. The common law writers discuss heiress-stealing in the same chapters as
rape, and the one crime may be considered a subcategory of the
other!7 The specific prohibition on stealing an heiress served to
protect the special interests of propertied families in the orderly
transfer of land and material wealth though a daughter to her
husband and children. This particular purpose could, perhaps,
have been effected by a rule invalidating marriages achieved by
45. W. HAWKINS, supra note 38, at 121-23.
46. M. HALE, supra note 2, at 153.
47. See, e.g., E. COKE, supra note 2, at 60; W. HAWKINS, supra note 38, at 123; G.
STEPHEN, supra note 35, at 265.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1981

19

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 3 [1981], Art. 7

964

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol.ll:945

abduction. But such a rule would hardly deter the would-be husband, who could well expect the family of a "defiled" and possibly pregnant heiress to prefer him to no husband at all. The act
of rape was thus an act of possession, rendering both the victim
and her inheritance the property of the rapist. Although the special attraction of an heiress gave rise to the need for a special
criminal prohibition, the forcible possession of a propertied virgin differed from that of any other woman only in the value of
the stolen property.48
As we have seen, rape law in the common law tradition has
been designed to protect the interests of both men and women
in the preservation of the chastity of women. The privilege of
. homicidal self-defense against rape demonstrates the significance which the law has recognized in these interests; a threat to
these interests, .like a threat to life itself, has been viewed as a
threat of harm so irreparable that prevention is vital. A close
examination of these interests and of the consequences of their
deprivation will explain their importance.

The concept of a man's "honor" as a function of the chastity of his wife or daughter runs deep in western culture and in

the Anglo-American legal tradition. That particular form of
"honor" which derives from the exclusive possession of a woman
has been regarded as an essential element of the definition of a
man, comparable to ideals of potency or bravery. A man's status
in his family and community, his prestige, and his self-esteem
may all depend on this form of honor. The man who has been
dishonored by unchastity in the women of his household may be
ostracized from the ranks of men, much like the one dishonored
by cowardice in battle. His conformity to the definition of manhood is undermined, and his place in the world of men becomes
uncertain. 49
48. "Eleanor of Aquitaine ••. lived her early life in terror of being 'rapt' by a vassal
who might through appropriation of her body gain title to her considerable property." S.
BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 17. See also id., at 17-20, on the acquisition of wives
through rape among primitive peoples of the Philippines and Mrica and among the Ancient Hebrews (citing the book of J:udges and the story of Dinah in Genesis).
49. The protection of male honor, defined as exclusive possession of one's wife, has
been considered so important that a few American jurisdictions have, until recently, permitted a husband to kill a man whom he finds in the act of adultery with his wife. N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40A 2-4(7) (1953) (repealed by 1964 N.M. Laws); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN.
art. 1220 (Vernon) (repealed by 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 399, § 3 (a»; UTAH CODE ANN.
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The -importance of masculine "honor," as thus defined, is
partly a matter of the prestige that derives from property ownership. The owner of material wealth derives social status from his
property and loses that status if his property is stolen. Similarly,
the husband or father of an attractive woman gains prestige
from his prized possession; if she is raped, his possession of her
is incomplete and his prestige declines accordingly. ISO
But masculine "honor," more than the price of possession, is
a symbol of a man's control over his domain and indeed of his
status as a free man. The western concept of freedom for men
has implied not only power over one's own activities but also
control over the use of one's property and over the fate of one's
dependents. A free man has been defined as one who has the
capacity to own property and to support and protect his family.
The rape of a man's wife or daughter, like the theft of his property, has undermined his sense of control over his household
and, with it, his sense of freedom; in his own eyes and those of
his peers, he is less free, and less of a man than he was before.
The role of ownership and control as elements of freedom
maybe seen in common law doctrines regarding robbery and
burglary, as well as rape. Coke observed that one may kill a robber on the highway with impunity, "for a man shall never give
way to a thief . . . . neither shall he forfeit anything."ISI This
reasoning indicates a view that the harm of robbery goes far be§ 76-30-10(4) (1953). See L. KANOWlTZ, supra note 24, at 92-93. Some courts have carried this rule so far as to deny the adulterer the right to resist the husband's attack
except by flight. See generally Dabney v. State, 21 So. 211 (Ala. 1897); Drysdale v. State,
83 Ga. 747, 10 S.E. 358 (1889); Reed v. State, 11 Tex. Crim. 509 (1882). Under the common law, a husband's killing of his wife's lover was manslaughter, although the common
law recognized that adultery was "the highest possible invasion of property." W. HAWKINS, supra note 38, at 84 n.4. See also M. HALE, supra note 2, at 486.
50. The importance of the property interest survives into the modem era.
[The consent standard in rape law] fosters, and is in tum bolstered by, a masculine pride in the exclusive possession of a
sexual object. The consent of a woman to sexual intercourse
awards the man a privilege of bodily access, a personal 'prize'
whose value is enhanced by sole ownership ...• an additional reason for the man's condemnation of rape may be
found in the threat to his status from a decrease in the 'value'
of his sexual 'possession' which would result from forcible violation . . . .
Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape, 62 YALE L.J. 55 (1952).
51. E. COKE, supra note 2, at 55.
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yond the loss of property; such a loss alone would not justify
prevention by homicide. The harm of robbery, as Coke describes
it, is the "giving way": The experience of being forced, arbitrarily and under no claim of right, to give up what is rightfully
one's own, and the impact of that experience on the status of the
victim as a free man.
Burglary also justified prevention by homicide under the
common law, for, according to Coke, "a man's home is his castle."1>2 The rule suggests that the impact of burglary, like robbery and rape, goes beyond property to the deeper value symbolized by the holding of property: the status of a man as safe,
secure, and in control of his environment. This status has been
viewed as a vital element of manhood, essential to the value of a
man's life. The threat to this status posed by the crimes of robbery, burglary, and rape has thus been viewed as a threat of irreparable harm.
For the male, then, the chastity of the women close to him
has been essential to his "honor," which, in turn, has implicated
his prestige, social status, and self-esteem. The consequences of
a deprivation of this "honor" have been severe and lasting. Its
loss through rape has thus been viewed as irreparable.
For women, too, chastity has been the source of a particular
kind of "honor," the loss of which has had serious consequences
for a woman's social status, self-esteem, and material well-being.
Womanly honor has meant reputation for chastity; and an honorable woman is one who is regarded by her community as in
conformity with sexual convention and, therefore, available for
exclusive possession by one man.
The "honor" of a woman, because of its implications for the
"honor" of any man with whom she might be associated, has dictated in tlarge measure her value to men. And in a world in
which women have been dependent on and subordinate to men,
52. "A man's home is his castle ... for where shall a man be safe if not in his
house?" ld. at 161. This common law concept has persisted. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTl', supra note 2, at 400. See generally People v. Eatman, 405 lli.2d 491, 91 N.E.2d
387 (1950); State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). Some modem sources include a requirement that the invader appear to intend to commit a felony against the inhabitants.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(ii) (Tent. Draft No.8, 1958).
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the fate of any particular woman has depended in large part on
her value to men. A threat of rape has posed to the female victim a loss of her "honor," with irreparable damage to her value
to men and with consequent harm to all aspects of her life
thereafter.5S
If the victim of rape happens to be a virgin, her loss is per-

manent in a particularly measurable way.r'4, The loss of virginity
through rape has been described as "defilement" and "defloration"; these words connote the permanent destruction of a vital
element of one's value-a permanent stain on one's identity.55
That stain might destroy her prospects for marriage, which may
offer the only opportunities for social status and material security.56 The victim may also suffer ostracism from both her peers
and her family as a result of the destruction of her value on the
scale by which young women have been measured. Along with
these consequences to her status, position, and future, the rape
victim also suffers the risk of pregnancy, which would doom
both her and her child to economic hardship and social
ostracism. 57
A rape victim who happens to be married might suffer consequences as severe as the maiden's loss of virginity. The wife in
Anglo-American tradition has depended on her husband for
financial support, social status, and prestige, and for her own
sense of identity and value. His esteem for her is vital to every
element of her well-being. But rape threatens the husband's regard for his wife; it threatens her interests in all the benefits she
receives' from him. To the extent that the wife's value to her
husband depends on his exclusive possession of her, the rape
might cause a loss of his affection and support, comparable to
53. Kant regards "womanly honor" as such an important interest as to excuse the
killing by a mother of her illegitimate child. I. KANT, supra note 11, at 202.
54. See M. FOSTER, supra note 2, at 274.
55. "Words like 'ravage' and 'despoiled' used to describe the rape victim reflect the
notion of a stain attaching to the body of the girl." Note, supra note 50, at 72.
56. The Hebrew and early English rules requiring the rapist to marry his victim may
have served to compensate the victim for this loss aa well as her father for the loss to his
status and estate. See also Note, supra note 50, at 70, which states that, in a social
structure in which marriage is an exchange of sexual access to the woman for economic
support from the man, "the woman's power to withhold or grant sexual access is an
important bargaining weapon."
57. One commentator suggests that the risk of pregnancy may have been viewed as
the principle harm of rape. G. STEPHEN, supra note 35, at 254.
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the loss that would result from an act of adultery. In ancient
Israel, for example, a wife who was raped would be stoned along
with her assailant, just as if she had committed adultery.lIs This
rule might reflect a popular disbelief in the occurrence of an actual rape, and an assumption that the act was in fact adultery;
but it conveys also a judgment that the victim's role in the act
carried little significance. Her value to her husband as an object
in his exclusive possession was destroyed by the event, regardless of the wife's behavior.

A husband's reaction of rejection following the rape of his
wife has occurred in modern times as well. During the 1970 war
in Bangladesh, hundreds of thousands of women were raped by
invading soldiers. And, in accord with Moslem tradition, most of
the victims' husbands subsequently rejected their wives, despite
the new government's efforts to persuade the men of the country
that these women were national heroines. 1I9 This response drew
international attention in an era of mass media and of concern
over rape as a political issue, but there is every reason to believe
that the more commonplace occurrence of rape on a city street
or in a burgled home has provoked similar responses.
Even if the experience of rape does not cause a husband to
reject his wife, the loss of her "honor," as defined above, might
well affect her value as an asset to him, and consequently his
respect and affection for her.eo In addition to these consequences
on the raped wife's marriage and related interests, the experi-·
ence of rape poses to a wife the same very practical risk it poses
to the unmarried woman: pregnancy, with attendant social and
financial consequences in the absence of a supportive father-tobe.
With a woman's social position, family relationships, and
financial security dependent on her "honor," which is a function
of her "chastity," her interest in avoiding rape may be seen as
comparable to her interest in the preservation of her life. Indeed, many women have preferred death to rape, and that

s.

58.
BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 19. The Babylonian rule was the same, except
that execution was by drowning. Id.
59. Id. at 79-80.
60. Brownmiller notes that, "Divorce after rape is not uncommon." Id. at 124.
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choice has received broad social and religious approval. The Roman legend of Lucretia, for example, tells of a rape victim who
killed herself to avoid shaming her husband. Her act of heroism
inspired the Romans to revolt against the Tarquin invaders, including Lucretia's assailant, and drive them from Rome.
Lucretia's suicide expresses her conclusion that the rape destroyed the value of her life, which was dependent on her chaste
status. Having lost her honor, she was more a liability to her
husband than an asset, and all she could offer him was proof of
her spiritual purity through the act of suicide. Lucretia's judgment of her own worth after being raped has been ratified by the
survival of her act in legend.61
The heroic female role of the chaste martyr has survived
into the modern era. In 1902, an eleven-year-old Italian girl
named Maria Goretti suffered death by stabbing at the hands of
a potential rapist whose demands she resisted. The rapist admitted later that he had given Maria the choice of submitting to his
will before he killed her, but she preferred death to unchastity.
In 1950, Maria Goretti was canonized by the Roman Catholic
Church.62
Along with Maria Goretti and Lucretia, women throughout
history have viewed rape as literally a fate worse than death.
That view has been sanctioned and perpetuated by religious institutions and by popular opinion as expressed in literature and
legend. It is no surprise, then, that the law has allowed women
to protect themselves from rape through means as drastic as
they would use to protect themselves from death.68
61. [d. at 328.
62. [d. at 330-31.
63. According to the rule of "utmost resistance," which prevailed for a time in a few
American jurisdictions, the rape victim ha~ not only a privilege but perhaps even a duty
to resist by any means available. Under this rule, unless the victim resisted "to the utmost," no rape had occurred. The rule suggests a distrust in the credibility of a woman's
expressions of non-consent; however much she might protest, she is presumed to consent
unless she resists "to the utmost." But, considering the danger to the woman's life that
might arise from resistance to an armed and determined rapist, the rule of utmost resistance may also suggest a social judgment that her chastity is as important as her life.
However, the rule of utmost resistance never prevailed under the common law and has
died out in those states that once applied it. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 178 Neb. 783, 135
N.W.2d 475 (1965); Reynolds v. State, 27 Neb. 90, 42 N.W. 903 (1889); Sowers v. Territory, 6 Oklo 436, 50 P. 257 (1897); Perez v. State, 50 TeL Crim. 34, 94 S.W. 1036 (1906);
State v. Hoffman, 228 Wis. 235, 280 N.W. 357 (1938).
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The loss of a woman's chastity, the chief harm which the
law has recognized in the crime of rape, has thus threatened irreparable damage to both the victim herself and her male relatives. The law has seen in the act of rape an irreparable loss to
the victim, susceptible of no adequate compensation or reparation after the fact. The permanence and significance of this
harm has included rape with murder, in a category of C?rimes the
prevention of which is a fundamental purpose of the state. Thus,
-when a situation arises in which state protection against the
crime is unavailable, the state has found no legitimate role and
has refrained from interference. Under such circumstances, the
law has recognized a privilege of the individual to act to prevent
the crime, just as he or she might if no state authority existed.
The common law doctrine of a privilege of homicidal selfdefense against rape reflects a recognition of irreparable harm in
the destruction of chastity through rape. This judgment is premised on the view that destruction of chastity is the primary harm
of rape, and that chastity is an interest vital to both men and
women. These premises have been valid in the context of a social system in which women hold the status of property, possessed by men through the sexual act, and valued according to
the completeness of that possession by a particular man. That
same system of social values still predominates in many parts of
the world as well as in certain areas in American society; elements of it still pervade American culture and law.
But a process of change has at least begun in both law and
culture. Although chastity may still be valued as a voluntary expression of the special love between spouses, it is no longer the
foundation of honor for either sex, and its loss through rape no
longer mandates the irreparable 4estruction of social position
and self-esteem. As chastity has lost its importance, other values, such as personal autonomy for women, have gained increasing recognition in law and public opinion. A movement has developed demanding changes in the law of rape to reflect a
modern understanding of the interests affected by rape, and
some legal changes have occurred. Rules of evidence in some
states now prohibit inquiry into the victim's previous sexual activity, and a few states have eliminated the exception for forciWomen's Law Forum
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ble rape between spouses. 64
If a changing understanding of the interests at stake necessitates changes in the law of rape, it also necessitates a re-examination of the privilege of homicidal self-defense against rape. If
a threat to chastity is no longer a threat of irreparable harm, it
cannot provide continuing legitimacy for the privilege. Unless
rape threatens irreparable harm to some other, newly recognized
interest, the rule of self-defense is obsolete and deserving of
change. A critical judgment of the rule of self-defense thus depends on identification and evaluation of the interests at stake.

m.

THE SCOPE OF THE DEFENSE: RAPE AS IRREPARABLE HARM IN THE MODERN WORLD

Modern efforts to describe the harm of rape have abandoned the language of chastity and focus instead on personal
harm to the victim. So far these efforts are only initial attempts,
and no precise statement of the harm of rape is yet available in
the law. Nevertheless, the decriptions that exist do identify
some of the interests affected.
The California Penal Code describes the harm of rape as
follows: "The essential guilt of rape consists of the outrage to
the person and feelings of the victim of the rape."65 This definition lacks precision, but it suggests two of the interests at stake:
physical integrity and psychological well-being. The United
States Supreme Court, in Coker v. Georgia,66 recognized a third
characteristic of the harm of rape, the deprivation of a woman's
power to choose her sexual partners:
[Rape] is highly reprehensible, both in a moral
sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim
and for the latter's privilege of choosing those
with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate vio64. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.305 (1977), 163.375 (1971).
65. CAL. PENAL CODE § 263 (West Supp. 1981), enacted in 1872. The statutory language was amended in 1979 to refer to the person and feelings of "the victim of the rape"
rather than those of the "female involved." 1979 Cal. Stats., ch. 994, § 3. See also F.
LUDWIG, RAPE AND THE LAW 3 (1977), in which the author states that the prohibition of
rape "is designed primarily to protect women from psychical and emotional outrage."
66. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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lation of self."67

A close examination of these three interests-psychological
health, physical integrity, and freedom of sexual choice-may
lead to a more precise understanding of the harm of rape. It is
well documented that an experience of rape tends to cause psychological injury to the victim. For some victims, because of
their age or psychological predispositic;ms, or because of the particular circumstances of the occurrence, the psychological injury
may be permanently crippling; for them, the harm of rape is irreparable in the same way that the loss of life or limb is
irreparable. 68
Whether or not a particular victim suffers serious psychological damage as a result of rape, the experience necessarily involves a physical invasion of the victim's most private inner being.69 The social value of personal space is evident in the
recognition of individual rights of privacy in both law and culture. The importance of personal space appears also in the elaborate system of etiquette that controls bodily proximity in
everyday interactions. The body, as the "envelope of the self,"
includes the most personal of private spaces.70 Some forms of
bodily invasion are, of course, trivial aspects of life in society-e.g., a hand on the shoulder or bodily contact in a crowd.71
Medical examinations and treatment are a more significant form
of bodily invasion which occur under controlled circumstances
for important reasons. The bodily contact that occurs in sexual
intercourse goes beyond any of these events to involve the most
invasive form of contact with the most private of personal
spaces. The same physical act may be transformed by willing
participation into a mutual exchange of love; indeed the consensual act derives its significance 'as a form of expression at least in
67. Id. at 597.

68. See generally Burgess & Holstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome, in FORCmLE RAPE:
THE CRIME, THE VICTIM, AND THE OFFENDER (D. Chappell & R. Geis, G. Geis ed. 1977); E.
HILBERMAN, THE RAPE VICTIM (1976); C. HURSCH, THE TROUBLE WITH RAPE (1977); F.
LUDWIG, supra note 65; and S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at ch. 10.
69. See S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 376, on bodily invasion in the definition of
rape. See also E. HILBERMAN, supra note 68, at ix-x, on invasion of personal space as
violation of the self; G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 705, suggesting that consent be
viewed as a justification for the bodily invasion of sexual contact.
70. E. HILBERMAN, supra note 68, at ix.
71. G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 705.
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part from the cultural and psychological importance of the personal space to which each participant grants the other access.
But without consent, the sexual act is the most extreme deprivation of physical integrity.
In addition to bodily invasion, rape involves a deprivation of
the victim's right of choice over her sexual activity-a violation
of her autonomy in an area which, for biological, historical, and
cultural reasons, has great significance. An individual's sexual
choices reflect factors ranging in importance from the mood of
the moment to one's readiness to reproduce; among these factors
may be marital commitments, religious faith or even religious
vows, personal values, health considerations, and personal taste.
The rapist overrides all factors, ignoring the victim's preferences
and demonstrating the predominance of his choices over hers.

Along with a danger of psychological damage, rape, by definition, involves a deprivation of physical integrity and autonomy. But these interests are also implicated by other violations,
such as burglary, robbery, false arrest, and kidnapping which do
not, at least under modern law, trigger a right of homicidal prevention. By examining these crimes and considering how the violations they involve differ from the violations involved in rape,
we may identify more precisely the harm of rape.
An invasion of private space occurs in the crime of burglary
as well as in rape. A home and its contents may be viewed as an
extension of the self. An intrusion into one's dwelling space may
be experienced as a violation comparable to the violation of bodily space. 72 But the space involved, while identified with the individual as an extension of his or herself, is still separate from
the individual. The burglary victim can disassociate himself or
herself from the violated space and establish a new home, if the
experience is so traumatic as to warrant such a response. But
the rape victim is intimately and inseparably connected to the
72. E. HILBERMAN, supra note 68, at ix. As we saw before, the significance of burglary in the common law reflected the importance to the male head of household of control over his domain as a symbol of his identity as a free man. But a man's control over
his household has lost at least some of its former importance for his status, and this
change is reflected in the modem rule that one may kill to prevent burglary only if one
reasonably fears that the burglar intends to commit a felony against the inhabitants of
the home in addition to the felonious entry. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d)(ii)
(Tent. Draft No.8, 1958); W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, supra note 3, at 400.
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space which is violated by the crime; that space is not merely an
extension of her, replaceable at will, but her own body.'Z3
Although the experience of physical invasion may be perceived as the most immediate offense of rape, the physical act
involved constitutes an invasion rather than an event of a wholly
different character simply because it occurs without choice. The
deprivation of choice, then, is the primary offense and deserves
close examination.
Deprivations of autonomy occur in robbery, false arrest, and
kidnapping as well as in rape. The robbery victim is, in Coke's
words, forced to "give way";'Z3.1 that is, he or she is deprived of
the freedom to choose between retaining property and relinquishing it. Control over one's property once carried such significance for the definition of a man that its deprivation through
robbery could legally be prevented by homicide. But the cultural
significance of this form of autonomy has lessened, so that the
modern rule permits homicide in prevention of robbery only if
the victim reasonably fears death or serious bodily harm.'Z· The
difference between the deprivation of autonomy inflicted by robbery and that inflicted by rape is in. the particular choices which
the victim is prevented from making, and the cultural significance assigned to those choices. When the freedom to control
one's property symbolized the status of a free man, the deprivation of that freedom was viewed as irreparable harm. If sexual
freedom holds a comparable symbolic value in modern culture,
then its deprivation similarly constitutes irreparable harm, triggering a privilege of self-defense.
73. The only other crime which involves a violation of such intimate personal space
is forcible sodomy, which both the common law and modern statutes have unanimously
held to justify prevention by homicide. W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1579-80; MODEL
PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (Tent. Draft No.8, 1958); See also People v. Collins, 189 Cal.
App. 2d 575, 11 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1961); State v. Robinson, 328 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. S. Ct.
1959).
. 73.1 E. COKE, supra note 2, at 55.
74. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 3, at 400. See also J. LOCKE, supra note 2, at
125-26, observing by way of analogy to robbery than an attempt to enslave also creates a
privilege to kill, since enslavement would give the aggressor the power to destroy the
victim's life. The analogy suggests the importance of autonomy as both a symbolic element of personhood and a source of capacity for self·protection. See also E. HILBERMAN,
supra note 68, at ix-x, on the violation of self and the consequent psychic stress involved
in robbery.
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The victim of false arrest is also deprived of autonomy; he
or she loses freedom of movement during the period of detention, and may also suffer indignity, inconvenience, and damage
to reputation. Nevertheless, false arrest has not traditionally
been held to justify prevention by homicide, although it has
been viewed as provocation sufficient to reduce homicide from
murder to manslaughter.71>
The deprivation of autonomy involved in false arrest differs
from that involved in rape in at least two respects. First, as in
the case of robbery, it differs in the cultural significance assigned
to the particular choices which the victim is prevented from
making. A deprivation of freedom of movement for a short period of time, although important, does not carry the degree of
significance for an individual's status as a free person that the
deprivation of control over one's property or over one's household once carried, or that a deprivation of sexual freedom may
carry today. A second, and perhaps even more important difference, is that false arrest occurs under a claim of right, which
includes an implicit recognition of the victim's status as a free
person; the victim is guaranteed due process, through which he
or she can expect vindication in due course. Thus, although the
victim is temporarily unable to exercise autonomy, his or her
status as a person with general rights of autonomy is not
impaired.
Kidnapping also involves a deprivation of freedom of movement. The deprivation involved in kidnapping is greater than
that involved in false arrest, because it may be prolonged and
because it occurs under no claim of right. Case law and commentary on the question of self-defense against kidnapping is scarce,
perhaps because a kidnapping which would not support the victim's reasonable fear of death is so unimaginable that a separate
rule for kidnapping has been unnecessary. Neither common law
writers nor most modern statutes include kidnapping in their
lists of crimes that justify homicidal self-defense,76 although, of
75. W. LAFAVE & A. SC01T, supra note 3, at 396-97. But see Perdue v. State, 5 Ga.
App. 821, 63 S.E. 922 (1909); State v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1883), for a
contradictory judicial view. See generally Chevigny, The Right To Resist an Unlawful
Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128 (1969).
76. Some statutes encompass kidnapping. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(b)
(McKinney 1968); ILL. ANN STAT. ch. 38, § 7-1 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
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course, an act of kidnapping could trigger a right of self-defense
by providing evidence of a threat of death, serious bodily harm,
or rape.'1'1 Kidnapping alone, however, unaccompanied by other
crimes, involves only a deprivation of autonomy. Like false arrest, kidnapping differs from rape to the same extent that freedom of movement differs in cultural significance from sexual
freedom.
The deprivation of autonomy that occurs in rape differs
from the deprivation involved in these other crimes in the nature and significance of the choice that is prevented; the extent
of the harm of rape, then, depends on the importance of sexual
autonomy for women in modern American culture. If a woman's
sexual autonomy is an essential characteristic of her status as a
free person, comparable in significance to the "honor" of a man
or woman under the common law, then rape still causes irreparable harm and should still trigger a right of homicidal selfdefense. '18
Two aspects of a woman's sexual autonomy give it particular importance: first, the role of sexuality as a means of emotional expression, and second, the history of denial of sexual
freedom to women. The significance of sexual freedom as a characteristic of personhood derives, at least in part, from the importance of sexuality as a means of emotional expression. The development and expression of emotional bonds, separate from the
urges of biology or instinct, is one of the characteristics of
human life that distinguishes people from all other animals. The
ability to express feelings of love is fundamental to the human
quality of a person's life. The rape victim is deprived of sexuality as a medium of emotional expression, on the occasion of the
rape and perhaps thereafter as well. The memory of an act of
sex without choice, performed by the rapist and experienced by
the victim as an expression of contempt rather than of love, may
77. w. BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at 1714, specifies fine and imprisonment, rather
than death, as punishment for kidnapping. In light of his capital punishment standard
for self-defense, the penalty suggests that kidnapping does not justify homicidal
prevention.
78. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 3, at 706, observing that changing attitudes toward
chastity should not be regarded as reducing the harm of rape, because U[t]he more seriously one takes the sexual autonomy of adult men and women, the more incriminating
an act of forcible intercourse."
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cause the victim to associate sexuality with the emotions she felt
on that occasion. That association could impair her ability thereafter to experience sexual intercourse as an expression of love
given and received. That result severely impairs her identity as a
human being.
Sexual freedom carries additional significance for women
because it is a type of autonomy which they have only recently
acquired, if they have it at all. Freedom of sexual choice has not
been a characteristic historically associated with women; indeed
it may be safe to say that most women throughout history have
had little or no autonomy in sexual matters. For this reason rape
has been viewed as a crime against the victim's "chastity" or her
husband's property rights, but seldom as a violation of the victim's own liberty.
Deprivation of sexual· freedom has been one of the most effective means by which women have been denied the status of
persons and reduced to the status of property. That men have
had sexual autonomy while women have not has stood as a symbol of the subordinate position of women in relation to men.
While men have been free people, capable of making choices and
acting upon their own choices, women have been the objects of
those choices, acted upon but prevented from acting on their
own behalf.'79
The deprivation of sexual autonomy in rape has functioned
as a symbol of the power of men over women. Rape has been
used in primitive cultures as a form of ritual discipline, applied
by groups of men to women who rebel against the restraints of
the feminine role. so The rape of an unknown woman on a modern city street may be another form of the same type of disciplinary action. The man who simply assumes that a lone woman is
a fair target is, in a sense, punishing his victim for presuming to
79. The value that men have always placed on their own sexual autonomy is evident
in the rule that forcible sodomy justifies prevention by homicide. See note 73 supra. See
also s. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 257-68, on homosexual rape in prisons as a
method of "conquest and degradation," through which physically strong men achieve
status in a social hierarchy by forcing weaker men to act as passive sexual objects, the
role assigned to women in the outside world.
80. S. BROWNMILLER, supra note 5, at 284-85, reports on systematic gang rape as a
method of punishment for rebellious women among primitive tribes in New Guinea and
Brazil.
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think that she may live an independent life free of male protection. Both the men of the primitive tribe and the rapist on the
modern city streets use rape to preserve and enforce the
supremacy of men over women in their societies. Through a
graphic reminder of women's lack of sexual choice, they remind
the rape victim and all other women of their overall subordination to men.
Rape operates to dehumanize women further when, as often
occurs during warfare between nations, classes, or races, men
rape to degrade other men through violation of "their" women.81
Under these circumstances, the woman's right to sexual freedom
is denied even the recognition inherent in its deliberate violation. Her body is the battleground for a struggle between men,
and the violation of her autonomy is only an incidental byproduct of warfare in which she does not otherwise participate.
This form of rape serves to impress upon all women that they
are not free persons, possessing rights of autonomy and integrity. They are, rather, items of property existing for use both by
and against their male owners.
Because of the history of its denial, sexual autonomy for women carries an importance that goes well beyond the significance
of sexuality as a means of emotional expression. Freedom of sexual choice symbolizes the full and independent personhood that
women are only beginning to achieve. The deprivation of that
freedom through rape symbolizes revival of the subordinate status to which women were so long relegated.
The harm of rape in the modern world, then, is the same as
the harm which the common law recognized in burglary, robbery, or the rape of a man's wife or daughter. Just as the male
head of household who suffered these crimes experienced an irreparable blow to his "honor"-his status as a free man in control of his environment and possessions-so the modem rape
victim may experience irreparable damage to her precarious status as a full-fledged human being, in control of herself, her body,
and her sexuality. Through the deprivation of interests which
symbolize the status of a free person, interests in bodily integrity, sexual autonomy, and the capacity to freely and actively
81. See generally id., at cbs. 3, 4 & 7.
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participate in sexual activity as a form of emotional expression,
the rape victim is deprived of her personhood just as, according
to the social perceptions underlying the common law rules, the
male victim of robbery or burglary, or the husband or' father of a
rape victim, was deprived of his personhood. The deprivation
that occurs in the modern rape is irreparable for the same reason that those deprivations were considered irreparable: Because
no subsequent legal proceeding can adequately compensate for
the loss which the victim has suffered. No amount of monetary
damages could make the victim whole, because the value of the
lost sense of personhood is immeasurable, and no punishment
inflicted on the perpetrator could provide full vindication to the
victim. Because compensation is impossible, prevention is essential. The modern rape victim, therefore, like the victim of burglary, robbery, or rape under the common law, has the right to
prevent the crime by any means necessary, including homicide.
IV. CONCLUSION
The privilege of self-defense is a form of recognition in the
criminal law of the purposes of the state and the limitations on
state authority. If government is a creation of free individuals,
established for the purpose of protecting the interests of its
members in their lives as human beings, then the authority of
government ends when it is unable to serve that purpose. An
individual who faces an immediate threat of irreparable damage
to his or her interests in human life is therefore freed of legal
restraint and privileged to employ any means necessary to prevent that deprivation.
Human life involves more than mere biological existence.
The rules of self-defense, which have always permitted the use
of deadly force in prevention of certain nondeadly crimes, express a universal judgment that certain interests are so important to the human quality of life that life without them does not
deserve the designation "human." One who loses these vital interests, according to the universal judgment expressed in the law
of self-defense, is no longer fully a person. The identity of those
interests is a matter of social judgment within each culture, subject to change as cultural values change.
The rules of self-defense under the common law reflect a set
of cultural judgments identifying the interests considered crucial
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to personhood. For men, these interests have included the status
of a free man, in control of his actions and his environment, in
full possession of whatever material wealth he may own, and
perhaps most important, in full and exclusive possession of the
women of his household. For women, these interests have included chastity and "honor," a status of bodily purity defined as
sexual "possession" by one man alone.
These cultural judgments have changed through time, so
that in modern American society the control over material possessions carries less significance for a man's personhood than it
once did. Cultural changes now in progress are rendering obsolete the concept of a man's "possession" of a woman through
sexuality, so that the chastity of a woman now carries less significance. The threat of such a deprivation therefore no longer justi:fies a homicidal response.
But other interests have increased in the value accorded by
cultural judgment. Personal autonomy, particularly in matters of
sexuality, and bodily integrity are two of the most important
values in modern society, values that modern American culture
considers vital to the identity of an individual as a full and free
person. For women, who have long been denied these essential
elements of humanity, these interests carry particular significance in the definition of personhood.
Rape is an actual and symbolic deprivation of the victim's
vital interests in sexual autonomy and bodily integrity. The experience of rape thus irreparably impairs the victim's status as a
full and free person. As a deprivation of personhood, or of life as
a human being, rape is one of the occurrences that government
exists to prevent. Where government intervention is unavailable,
however, and no less drastic method would prevail, prevention
may occur through an individual's use of the deadly force usually reserved for the state. By declining to prohibit or punish the
use of deadly force under such circumstances, the cri:minal law
expresses a recognition of the origin and purposes of the state
and of the limitations on its power.
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